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Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products
Liability and the Demise of the Consumer
Expectations Test
lZebecca }(orzec*

INTRODUCTION

The threshold issue in American products liability litigation is
whether the product was defective at the time it left the manufacturer's
controI.l Traditionally, courts and scholars define "defect" in three
functional categories: manufacturing defects, design defects and marketing defects. 2 American products liability doctrine employs two major
tests to determine whether a "defect" exists: the seller-oriented risk-utility test and the buyer-oriented consumer expectations test. 3 The Draft

* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.
I See, e.g., David Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning ofDefect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974);
see also Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Ore. 1974) ("Courts continue to

flounder while attempting to determine how one decides whether a product is in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user."). Cf Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730,
740 (N.Y. 1995) (Simons,]., dissenting: "[T]he word 'defect' has no clear legal meaning.").
2 A manufacturing defect is "an abnormality of a condition that was unintended, and makes
the product more dangerous than it would have been as intended." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984). A design defect occurs
when the product is manufactured according to the intended design, but the design poses
unintended, unreasonable dangers. SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr.,Judicial Review ofManufacturers'
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1543 (1973)
[hereinafter Henderson,Judicial Review]. Professor Keeton describes marketing defect in terms
of failure to warn: "A manufacturer or other seller is subject to liability for failing to warn or
adequately to warn about a risk or hazard inherent in the way a product is designed .... " KEETON
ET AL., supra, § 96, at 685.
3 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1532-33 (1992) [hereinafter Henderson
& Twerski, A Proposed Revision]. The risk-utility and consumer expectations tests are alternative
tests for determining strict liability for defective products under § 402A of the Restatement 2d of
Torts. See Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.2d 248, 252 (Miss. 1993). The Supreme Court
of Mississippi compared the two tests as follows:
[1] n a "consumer expectations" analysis, for a plaintiff to recover, the defect in a product
which causes his injuries must not be one which the plaintiff, as an ordinary consumer,
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of the Restatement Third of Torts: Products Liability, like some American jurisdictions, rejects the "consumer expectations" test as an independent standard in defective warning and design cases.4 Ironically,
this limitation of the use of the consumer expectations test in American
products liability doctrine 5 coincides with the European Community's6
would know to be unreasonably dangerous to him. In other words, if the plaintiff,
applying the knowledge of an ordinary consumer, sees a danger and can appreciate that
danger, then he cannot recover for any injury resulting from that appreciated danger.... In a "risk-utility" analysis, a product is uunreasonably dangerous" if a reasonable
person would conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs
the utility of the product.

Id. at 254.
4REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Preliminary Draft No.3, 1996);
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No.2, 1995); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Preliminary Draft No.1, 1993) [hereinafter
REsTATEMENT DRAFT]. On September 17,1993, the reporters, Professors James Henderson and
Aaron Twerski, released Council Draft No.1, which differs slightly from Preliminary Draft No. 1.
Compare REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Council Draft No.1, 1993) wilh
REsTATEMENT DRAFT, supra. Tentative Drafts Nos. 2 and 3 were prepared for submission to tile
members of the American Law Institute at its annual meetings on May 16-19, 1995 and May
14-17, 1996, respectively. Tentative Drafts remain tentative until the final publication is autllOrized. The bylaws of the American Law Institute provide that: "Publication of any work as representing the Institute's position requires authorization by the membership and approval by tile
Council." AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, 73RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE:
PROCEEDINGS 1996, at 554 (1997).
Professor Marshall Shapo refers to the Restatement Third approach to the consumer expect.'ltions test as "[A] lamentable defect in the reporters' analysis...• " Marshall S. Shapo, In Search
of the Law of Products Liability: The All Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 665 (1995)
[hereinafter Shapo, In Search of the Law]. Essentially, the Restatement Third approach concludes
that the risk-utility test is the main approach for determining product defectiveness. The reporters
argue that "consumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard for judging the
defectiveness of product designs." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, cmt. f; REsTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No.1, 1994). This leaves tile
consumer expectations test available in manufacturing defect cases, such as contaminated food.
See REsTATEMENT DRAFT, supra, § 3. The reporters conclude that unlike defective design or
defective marketing cases, defective manufacture cases require a finding that the product fails
"to function as a reasonable person could expect it to function." Id. At least four commentators
have concluded that the reporters' position that most jurisdictions reject the consumer expect.'ltions test, except in manufacturing defect cases, is simply inaccurate. See Roland F. Banks &
Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second), Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L.
REv. 411, 415-20 (1993); Howard F. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of
the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1173,
1173-76 (1994); ·Shapo, In Search of the Law, supra, at 666; John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New

Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a 'New Cloth' for Section 402A Products Liability Design
Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different l%ave, 26 U. MElli. L. REv. 493, 518-19 (1996).
5 REsTATE!lfENT DRAFT, supra note 4, §§ 101, 103.
6The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) when the Treaty on
European Union, othenvise known as the Maastricht Treaty, came into force in November, 1993.
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adoption of the consumer-oriented test for European strict products
liability cases.'
This article analyzes these contemporary developments. First, it considers the implications of the European Union's (EU) Council Directive No. 85/374 (European Directive) for American products liability
law. It then analyses the consumer expectations test in light of the
purpose of products liability law. Reconsideration of the consumer
expectations test suggests that, properly constructed and applied, the
consumer-oriented test promotes considerations of safety, equity, and
efficiency.

I.

THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE AND AMERICAN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY

LAw

A. Strict Liability and Consumer Expectations

As the EU moves toward implementation of strict liability for defective products, American products liability law is reevaluating its legal
and social significance.s Like most laws, strict products liability embodies a codification of social policy.9 As between the manufacturer who
brings the product to market and the buyer who uses it as intended,
who is more responsible for the product? Who is in the better financial
position to pay for product injuries? Strict liability theory places these
costs on the manufacturer even though he or she is without fault or
See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 (1992). For purposes of consistency, both the European Union and the pre-Maastricht Treaty European Community will be referred to as the European Union.
7 See Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products,
arts. 1,6(1),28 OJ. (L 210) 29,30-31 [hereinafter 1985 European Directive]. OnJuly 25,1985,
the EU adopted a uniform products liability directive. See id.; see generally Marshall S. Shapo,
Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European and American Law, 26 CORNELL INT'L. LJ. 279
(1993); Jean Stapleton, Products Liability Reform-Real or Illusory?, 6 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 392
(1986).
8 See, e.g., David G. Owen, DeJectiveness Restated: Expwding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth,
1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743 (1996) [hereinafter Owen, DeJectiveness Restated]; William Powers,Jr., A
Modest Proposal To Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 639 (1991); Angela C.
Rushton, Design Dejects Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reassessment of Strict Liability and
the Goals of a Functional Approach, 45 EMORY LJ. 389 (1996); Shapo, In Search of the Law, supra
note 4.
9 See, e.g., VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
(1995); FiemingJames,Jr., Products Liability (Pt. II: Manufacturers), 34 Thx. L. REv. 192,227-28
(1955); George L. Priest, The Invention ofEnterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations ofModern Tort Law, 14J. LEG. STUD. 461 (1985) [hereinafter Priest, The Invention].
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liability under traditional negligence or warranty concepts. IO Even the
non-negligent manufacturer is morally responsible since he or she
designed, tested and manufactured the product; he or she placed it
into the marketplace. ll From an economic point of view, strict liability
makes two assumptions. First, the manufacturer made a profit from a
particular product, and on all similar products sold. I2 Second, if the
manufacturer pays for the damages caused by his or her product, he
or she can pass the costs on to the consuming public through higher
prices. 13 Spreading the cost created by a relatively small number of
defective products across the cost of all units sold should result in only
minor price increases to the consuming public. I4
Strict products liability is designed to promote both safety and fairness. I5 In fact, the original purpose for adopting strict products liability was to relieve the injured consumer from the enormous burdens
of proving either negligence or the overly technical requirements of
warranty. 16 The primary rationale behind this doctrine is that, since the
manufacturer profits from product sales, he or she should pay for any
damage caused by that product. I7 Paying for accidents becomes a cost
of doing business. IS In theory, only products which generate profits
10 See Priest, The Invention, supra note 9, at 505; see also George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability:
The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2301 (1989) [hereinafter Priest, Original Intent]. For a
critique of Priest's analysis, see David G. Owen, The Intelledual Development of Modern Prodtlets
Liability Law: A Comment on Priest's View of the Cathedral's Foundations, 14 j. LEG. STUD. 529
(1989) [hereinafter Owen, IntelledualDevelopment]; Gary Schwartz, The Beginning amI the Possible
End of the Rise of Modern Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601 (1992).
II See, e.g., john Attanasio, The Principle ofAggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to
Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REv. 677 (1988).
12 See john E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Refledions on the Theory and Administration of
Strid Tort Liability for DeJedive Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 809-10 (1976).
13 Id.; see also MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS 72, 75-77 (1995).
14 See Montgomery & Owen, supra note 12, at 808-10. Critiques of the traditional policy
arguments include Sheila Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Deject: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strid Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980); Priest, The Invention, supra
note 9; Alan Schwartz, Producls Liability and Judicial ffi?alth Redistributions, 51 IND. LJ. 558

(1976).
15 See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); see generally john W.
Wade, On the Nature of Strid Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. LJ. 825 (1973) [hereinafter
Wade, On the Nature of Strid Liability].
16 See Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Producls Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435, 459-61
(1979).
17 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
LJ. 1055 (1972).
18 See Greenman v. YUba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) ("The purpose of
[strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
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after all true production costs, including safety costs, are paid will
remain on the market. 19 Under a true strict liability regime, recovery
depends neither on manufacturer fault nor negligence, but on the
manufacturer's responsibility for the product which caused "injury."2o
In this sense, the manufacturer bears ultimate responsibility for product safety.21
Criticizing strict liability doctrine for failing, in an efficient way, to
produce safe products ignores the issue of moral responsibility.22 Admittedly, strict liability may make manufacturers more careful, thereby
creating safer products. 23 Such product safety, however, complements
the predominate goal: assuring that manufacturers pay the actual costs
of product injuries. 24 The only significant inquiry for strict liability
analysis is who should pay these costs.25 Clearly, accident costs not paid
by the manufacturer necessarily fall on the injured party.26 As between
the manufacturer, who places the defective product on the market, and
the injured party, the manufacturer should bear the immediate, direct
financial responsibility.27 Ultimately, consumers as a whole underwrite
the cost of product injury in the loss-spreading price increases passed
on to them by the manufacturer. 28 As a result, the market price of a
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves."); w. Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning oj
DeJect,5 ST. MARY's LJ. 30, 35 (1973) ("A fourth and perhaps major reason ordinarily given for
strict liability in this area is that those engaged in the manufacturing enterprise can serve
effectively as risk distributors accepting responsibility for accident losses attributable to the
dangerousness of products as a cost of doing business.").
19 See Richard Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 209-12 (1973). Cj Gary
T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Anarysis oJ Tort Law: Does Tort Law Realry Deter?, 42 UCIA
L. REv. 377 (1994).
20 See generalry Richard A. Posner, A Theory oj Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
21 See, e.g., Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900; McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn.
1967); see generaUy Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE LJ. 353 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Proposals Jor ReJorm].
22 See generaUy David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427 (1993) [hereinafter Owen, MoraIFoundations].
23 See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability, supra note 15, at 866; see also GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 73 (1970).
24 See, e.g., David G. Owen, Musings on Modern Products Liability Law: A Foreword, 17 SETON
HALL L. REv. 505 (1987).
25 See Owen, MoralFoundations, supra note 22, at 429-30 (1993).
26 See Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings oJDeJective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN.
L. REv. 363, 375 (1965).
27 See, e.g., Gary Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics oj Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL
L. REv. 313 (1990).
28 See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 26, at 366.
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product reflects the true cost of that product, including accident
costs. 29
Examination of the historical underpinnings of strict products liability reveals that the original § 402A possesses a decidedly pro-consumer
orientation.30 Strict liability for defective products was intended to
relieve the injured consumer from the burdensome requirements of
proving either negligence or breach of warranty.31 Historically, the
consumer expectations test is the natural, logical result of strict products liability as the extension of implied warranty law. 32 Recognition of
the protection of reasonable consumer product safety expectations
essentially dictates the adoption of the consumer expectations test.ss
B. The European Directive and the Consumer Expectations Test

The European approach to consumer expectations owes much to
American products liability doctrine. In turn, it can be a corrective
reminder that reasonable consumer expectations have a central position in products liability analysis. In part, the European Directive
resulted from the demand for product safety following the thalidomide
tragedy in Europe during the 1960s.34 An additional reason for its
implementation was the need to harmonize the differing national rules
for products liability for economic reasons. A single strict liability
29 See, e.g., David Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1980)
[hereinafter Owen, Rethinking the Policies].
30 See generaUy Priest, Original Intent, supra note 10.
3l See Priest, The Invention, supra note 9, at 508-09. Cf. Owen, Intellectual Development, supra
note 10.
32 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 348.

Many courts have used consumer expectations as a criteria for defining defect. If a
consumer reasonably expects a product to be safe to use for a purpose, the product is
defective if it does not meet those expectations. The consumer expectations test is
natural since strictliabilily in tort developed from the law of warranty. The law ofimplied
warranty is vitally concerned with protecting justified expectations since this is a fundamental policy of the law of contracts.

Id.
33 See Michael D. Bernacchi, A Behavioral Model for Imposing Strict Liability in Tort: The Importance ofAnalyzing Product Performance in Relation to Consumer Expectation and Frustration, 47 U.
CIN. L. REv. 43, 49-50 (1978); F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Nonllative
Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REv. 465, 467-84 (1978):
John Neely Kennedy, The Role of the Consumer Expectation Test Under Louisiana's Products Liability
TortDoctrine, 69 TuL. L. REv. 117,139-42 (1994).
34 See Ferdinando Albanese & Louis F. Del Duca, Developments in European Product Liability, 5
DICK.]. INT'L. L. 193, 193-94 (1987); Kathleen M. Nilles, Note, Defining the Limits of Liability: A
Legal and Political Ana~sis of the European C01lImunity Products Liability Directive, 25 VA. J. INT'L.

L. &

COM.

155 (1986).
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regime would place all tvvelve Member States on an equal footing,
eliminating the risk that consumers would receive differing amounts
of protection or that producers in Member States having stricter regimes would be financially disadvantaged. 35
Before the European Directive, the products liability laws of the
individual Member States varied greatly. Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Spain maintained traditional negligence systems with the plaintiff retaining the traditional burden of proof. 36 Denmark, Germany, the
Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom had a presumption of
liability shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, which resembled strict liability.37 Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg had absolute
strict liability regimes. 38
Implementation of the European Directive by the Member States was
slow and uneven. For example, Germany eventually enacted the Product Liability Act of 15 December 1989.39 It took some time for Germany
to transform the European Directive because the German Government
considered existing German law to have already met, if not exceeded,
the goals of the European Directive.4o German courts had imposed
strict liability for defective products by reversing the burden of proof
in the famous Fowl PestU case.42
Article 6 of the European Directive provides:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety
which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances
into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the
product would be put; [and]
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
55 See Heinz]. Dielmann, The European Economic Community's Council Directive on Product
Liability, 20 INT'L.LAW. 1391, 1391 (1986).
36 See generally Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 34; Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, Heirs of
Leonardo: Cultural Obstacles to Strict Products Liability in Italy, 27VAND.]. 'TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1994);
Nadine E. Roddy, Strict Product Liability in Europe: The EEC and the Directive on Defective Products,

12 PROD. LIAB. TRENDS 97 (1987).
37 See generally Lord Griffiths et al., English Product Liability Law, 62 'nIL. L. REv. 353 (1988).
38 See Frank A. Orban, III, Product Liability: A Comparative Legal Restatement-Foreign National
Law and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J. INT'L. & COMPo L. 342, 344 (1978); see generally HARRY
DULINTER ThBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY (1979).
39Produkthaftungsgesetz (ProdHaftG), v.1989 (Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] S.2198)
(F.RG.).
40 See NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LAw & LEGAL SYSTEM 144-46, 235-37 (1993).
41 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 51, 9l.
42 See]oachim Zekoll, The Gennan Products Liability Act, 37 AM.]. COMPo L. 809, 810 (1989).
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2. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole
reason that a better product is subsequently put into circulation. 43
The European Directive imposes strict liability through its definition
of "defect." Article 6(1)'s definition of defect is modeled on the consumer expectations test of § 402A comment i to the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 44 Comment i provides the basis of the consumer expectation test by stating that a product is defective if it is "dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics. "45
43 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 6. The key provisions of the European Directive
present interesting similarities and differences with American law. A brief summary is useful.
Article 1 places liability on the producer for damage caused by a defect in his or her product.
See id. art. 1. Article 2 defines "product" in terms of moveable items. See id. art. 2. This provision
is analogous to the Uniform Commercial Code definition of "goods" in Article 2-105. See U.C.C.
§ 2-105 (1994).
Article 3 defines "producer" as: (a) the manufacturer of the finished product; (b) the producer
of a component or raw material; or (c) one who holds himself or herself to be the product
manufacturer by, for example, placing his or her name or trademark on the product. See 1985
European Directive, supra note 7, art. 3. In addition, the importer of a product is deemed to be
a producer if the imported product is placed into distribution in the ordinary course of business.
See id. If the actual manufacturer cannot be identified, Article 3 requires that each seIler be
treated as the producer unless he or she indicates the name of the actual manufacturer and that
manufucturer is subject to local jurisdiction. See id. If the product is imported, the seller may
avoid liability by indicating the name of the importer. See id. Article 4 requires proof of causation.
See id. art. 4. Article 5 adopts joint and several liability. See 1985 European Directive, supra note
7, art. 5. Article 6 defines the defect in terms of the consumer expectations test. See id. art. 6.
The defect must exist at the time the product was placed into commerce by the producer. See itl.
In addition, a product may be defective in its "presentations," which includes packaging, labeling
and directions for use. See id. Therefore, failure to warn of potential dangers wiII be actionable.
See id. The language of the European Directive strongly parallels the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Compare 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 6 with REsTATEMENT (SECOND) m'
TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1964). Comment ito § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides
that: "the article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1964).
Article 7 establishes producer defenses. See 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 7. An
earlier draft had excluded "development risks" or a "state of the art" defense, as it is called in
American products liability law. See id. However, Article 7(e) of the European Directive allows
such a defense. See id. art. 7 (e). "State of the art" generally refers to scientific knowledge available
at a particular time. Article 15 permits the elimination of the state of the art defense. See itl. art.
15. In most American jurisdictions, this defense is available in failure to ,varn cases.
44 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1964).
45 [d. Professor Marshall Shapo argues that the European Directive "projects a conception of
strict liability that is, if anything, more extensive and consumer biased than virtually any American
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The attempt by the EU to harmonize the products liability law of the
Member States should inform the American national debate on products liability. The European Directive recognizes that defective products can cause extensive harm to individual consumers.46 Without the
European Directive, however, the legal position of an injured person
varies according to the legal standards of the individual Member
States.47 The European Directive establishes one standard, strict liability, as the common denominator for consumer product safety.48 Significantly, it also adopts the consumer expectations test as the standard
for determining product safety.49
Much of the scholarly criticism heaped on the American consumer
expectations test might be avoided by focusing on what the consumer
is entitled to expect, rather than on what the particular user actually
knows or expects in either a literal or idiosyncratic sense. Once the
emphasis is on the consumer's entitlement to certain product safety
expectations, the consumer-oriented standard becomes quite workable. The consumer could establish the entitled expectation from a
number of sources, including the following: (a) manufacturer's representations;50 (b) governmental safety regulations;51 (c) industry standards and guidelines; (d) information in the public domain; or (e)
general community information concerning products.52 Expert testimony would be permitted or, in some cases, even required, to demonstrate the standard of entitlement under this consumer expectation
test. 53

state jurisprudence. . . . Its most salient feature is the strength of the desire for consumer
protection reflected in its overall architecture." Shapo, In Search of the Law, supra note 4, at 650.
46 See Giulio Ponzanelli, The European Community Directive on Products Liability, in TORT LAw
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 238, 241 (Peter H. Shuck ed., 1991).
47 See id. at 239-41.
48 See id. at 241.
49
50

See id.
See Leichthamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 578 (Ohio 1981) (safety repre-

sentations of jeep manufacturer encouraged consumer risk-taking).
51 Government-mandated warnings concerning cigarettes and alcohol, for example, may inform the public generally, thereby creating expectations concerning safety.
52 See Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1982) (alcohol is not an unreasonably dangerous product because the dangers of drinking alcohol are common knowledge).
53For example, experts in human factors engineering, psychology and communications have
testified about the adequacy of warnings. See, e.g., Prevatt v. Pennwalt Corp., 237 Cal. Rptr. 488
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Long v. Deere & Co., 715 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1986); Smith v. United States
Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251 (Okla. 1980); see generally William H. Hardie, Scare Tactics: Motivating
Warning Compliance, PROD. bAB. DAILY (BNA) (Sept. 12, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAPLD File.
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The importance of this consumer-oriented approach is that it establishes the consumer viewpoint as the starting point for product liability
analysis. This is more than a matter of mere semantics. Historically,
reasonable consumer safety concerns have been and should remain
the primary concern of products liability law.54 Economic concerns
should have only secondary significance.55 At a minimum, consumers
are entitled to an expectation that manufacturers, as experts in the
field, will sell products which are as safe as possible, given technological
and scientific feasibility.56 At the same time, consumers are not entitled
to expect product safety if harm is caused by product uses or misuses
which the consumer knows or should have known to be unreasonably
dangerous. 57
Defect and consumer use issues must be determined according to
the state of the art, that is, the scientific and technological knowledge
available at the time the product is marketed. 58 To a significant extent,
this approach recognizes that the product user and the product producer have reciprocal obligations concerning product safety.59 In other
words, if the product defect actually causes a safety hazard, product
manufacturers should be held responsible for foreseeable harm unexpected by consumers.60 However, product users ought to be held re-

54 See

MINN.

generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
L. REv. 791 (1966).

See, e.g., Shapo, In Search of the Law, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Oscar S. Gray, The Draft All Product Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachronism?,
61 ThNN. L. REv. 1105 (1994); Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles Hee~ 61 ThNN. L. REv. 1265 (1994).
57 See ThBBENS, supra note 38, at 150.
55
56

The meaning of the qualification "is entitled to expect" constitutes another "moral
datum," to use Ehrenzweig's term. The Strasbourg Report observes only that the expectations may be higher than mere observance of statutory rules; the EC Memorandum
is silent on this point. Again one looks for a yard-stick in determining what will make
expectations legitimate (the French text renders this normative clement by using "Iegitimement"). Perhaps the main criterion is what representations the producer has
made, e.g., in publications and directions for use, in short the product's presentation
as referred to in the Strasbourg Convention.

ld.
58 SeeJohn W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marlleting, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 750-51 (1983). State of the art is termed "development risks" under
Article 7 of the European Directive. 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 7.
59 See generally David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REv. 703 (1992) [hereinafter Owen, The
Fault Pit]; David G. Owen, Phiicsophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL

FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
60 See generally David G. Owen, Products Liability Principles
238 (1991).

ofJustice,
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sponsible for injuries resulting from product uses which they recognize
or should recognize to create unreasonably dangerous risks. 61
These reciprocal safety responsibilities are promoted by the prevailing consumer-oriented test employed in manufacturing defect cases. 62
Despite a manufacturer's non-negligent efforts and the reasonableness
of these efforts, production errors can cause accidents. 63 Even if a
manufacturer could demonstrate that he or she had exercised the
highest possible care, societal attitudes have evolved to create the
expectation that consumers are entitled to expect basic physical integrity in products: the soda pop bottle should not explode; food should
not be contaminated. 64 Reasonable consumer expectations are protected in part because the consumer is entitled to the basic product
safety for which he or she pays.65 Consumer autonomy is preserved by
the current approach. 66
Some scholars argue that application of this consumer-oriented
analysis to warning and design cases is unworkable and ineffective. 67
Focusing on reasonable consumer entitlement to expectations, rather
than idiosyncratic knowledge, becomes crucial. Although design decisions cannot be expected to ensure absolute product safety, it is, nevertheless, essential to use consumer expectancy as the starting point of
analysis. If the focus is on the safety the consumer is entitled to expect,
the determination of entitlement necessarily takes into account the
product design, including directions and warnings, technologically
and scientifically possible at the time of manufacture. 68 Reasonable
product users would not believe they are entitled to have manufacturers pay for their negligent or unforeseeable conduct in using products. 69 Similarly, reasonable consumers would not believe that manu61 See generally Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict LialJility
Actions for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1189 (1994); see also General Motors v.

Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977) ("We cannot charge the manufacturers of a knife when
it is used as a toothpick ....").

See Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 22, at 429-30.
See Howard Klemme, The Ente7prise LialJility ofTorls, 47 COLO. L. REv. 153, 191-92 (1976).
&I See, e.g., Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1966) (decomposed
62
63

mouse in bottle of "Squirt" soda).
63 See, e.g., Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products LialJility, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077
(1965).
66 See Phillips, supra note 56, at 1273.
67 SeeJames A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled
Waler.5?, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1257, 1264 (1993).
68 See Ellen Wertheimer, UnknowableDangers and the Death ofStrict Producls LialJility: TheEmpire
Strikes Back, 60 U. CrN. L. REv. 1183, 1197-98 (1992).
69The user's contributory negligence will bar recovery in strict liability in tort provided this
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facturers could produce products beyond the safety possible under the
scientific and technological knowledge available at the time of product
design and manufacture. 7o
Professor James Henderson argues that the consumer expectations
test permits the marketplace to decide the degree of safety which
should be designed into the product. 71 In applying the consumer
expectations test to design defects, courts do not evaluate the design
itself.72 Instead, courts require manufacturers to fully disclose product
risks so as to permit consumers to make informed decisions about the
amount of product safety to purchase. 73 If the consuming public wants
certain safety features, manufacturers will respond to market demands. 74 On the other hand, products with too many safety features
will not sell, 'ultimately driving them from the market. 75
As a result, the consumer-oriented test might prove quite effective
in design cases. 76 Admittedly, courts may not be equipped to evaluate
the complicated scientific data inherent in product design choices. If
courts cannot develop and apply meaningful design standards, ultimately cases will be decided by the whim of individual juries.77 Such
inconsistent jury verdicts promote neither safety nor efficiency. Nevertheless, employing a risk-utility balancing test does not insure that
every jury will reach the same design conclusion about the effectiveness of a particular product. 78 Redesigning complex products according to the whims of conflictingjury decisions is unworkable. 79 However,

negligence is the sole proximate cause of injury. See, e.g., Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 647 A.2d 841
(NJ. App. Div. 1994); see generally Aaron Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring
Assumption ofRisk in the Products Liamlity Era, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1974).
70 See, e.g., Little, supra note 61, at 1201-03.
71 See Henderson,judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1560-62.
72 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 348 ("Many courts have used consumer expectations as a criteria
for defining defect. If a consumer reasonably expects a product to be safe to use for a purpose,
the product is defective if it does not meet this expectation.").
73 See, e.g, Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L.
REv. 1193 (1994).
74 Safety devices on circular saws are a common example. See, e.g., Verne L. Roberts, Circular
Saw Design: A Hazard Analysis, 1 J. PROD. LIAB. 127 (1977).
75 See Henderson,judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1558-62.
76 Some jurisdictions continue to employ the consumer expectations test as the primary test of
defect. See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982); Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer
Corp., 765 P.2d 770 (OkIa.1988); see also Note, The Consumer Expectations Test in Newjersey: What
Can Consumers Expect Now?, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1381 (1989).
77 See Henderson, judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1558.
78 See David Epstein, The Risks oJRisk Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L. REv. 469, 475-76 (1987).
79 This argument often arises in automobile crashworthiness or enhanced injury litigation. See,
e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
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this concern is an issue of process or procedure rather than the result
of employing a particular definition of product defect.80
Similar arguments apply to defective marketing or failure to warn
cases. If warnings and instructions are overly detailed, increasing product price without corresponding safety improvement, consumers eventually will refuse to pay for this "unnecessary" safety.8l On the other
hand, if additional warnings and instructions result in useful safety
information, consumers may be willing to bear the expense.82 In this
sense, stronger warnings complement stronger product designs.83
Ultimately, the manufacturer is responsible for producing a safe
product, while the consumer is responsible for using that product
safely. If the consumer expectations standard is viewed from this entitlement perspective, the standard requires the product user to be
responsible for harm resulting from product uses falling below the
norm to be expected of reasonable product safety.84 Some scholars
argue that products liability law should not entertain arguments concerning consumer user responsibility, because "contributory negligence" principles have no place in strict liability analysis. 85 However,
consumer expectations about safety entitlement demand that individual consumers, rather than manufacturers or the entire consuming
population, be responsible for their own errors and risk-taking in using
products.86 Moreover, in cases in which responsibility for the product
accident is shared by both the manufacturer and the consumer, comparative fault principles should apply.87

BOThe exploration of these procedural issues is beyond the purview of this article. However,
areas to be looked at include expanded review of the role of the judge in keeping questionable
cases from the jury, alternative dispute resolution, and expert panels.
81 See, e.g., Rebecca K. Phillips, Crashworthiness in the Commonwealth: An Analysis of the Difectiveness of Tractors Without ROPS, 23 N. Ky. L. REv. 325 (1996) (considering whether a litigant
can establish a cause of action in Kentucky against the manufacturer of a tractor lacking rollover
protection devices (ROPS»; see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw
175-86 (4th ed. 1972).
82 See generally David M. Grether et aI., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 (1986).
83 See, e.g., Shea Sullivan, Football Helmet Product Liability: A Survey of Cases and Call for Reform,
3 SPORTS LAw J. 233 (1996); see also Schwartz, Proposals for Reform, supra note 21, at 396-98.
IH See VICTOR SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 17-5 (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE].
85 See Owen, Rethinking the Policies, supra note 29, at 710-711.
86 See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative
Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REv. 281 (1994).
87 See generally SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 84, at ch. 11.
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THE CREATION OF CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS

Product accidents occur because the manufacturer, the user, or both
have imperfect knowledge about the product, its use and the user's
level of knowledge. 88 Both manufacturers and users have concrete
expectations about both the ability of consumers to use products safely
and the degree of safety responsibility attributable to manufacturers or
consumers. In effect, then, the consuming public possesses basic expectations about both consumer norms of conduct and manufacturer
safety responsibility.89
To a significant degree, manufacturers create consumer safety expectations through product labeling and advertising. 90 The manufacturer who makes false statements about his or her product (even
though made non-negligently, or even innocently) creates legitimate
and reasonable consumer expectations which merit protection. 91 In
effect, the manufacturer makes the statements to induce consumers to
purchase the product.92 Safety information provided by the manufacturer is justifiably important to consumers.93 This is especially true
when the harm created by the product defect creates a "surprise
element of danger."94 Consumers reasonably rely on the manufacturer's expertise and integrity in making safety promises.95 Absent these
promises, individual consumers might invest in independently obtaining more product information. 96
Moreover, consumers actually pay for quality control or other safetyassurance procedures in the product price.97 Consequently, manufacturers should be required to pay for false safety representations which
cause injury.98 Anything less results in the consumer losing both the
See generaUy Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 2.
See Hubbard, supra note 33, at 484-91; Marshall Shapo, A Representational Theory oj Consumer
Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability Jor Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109
(1974) [hereinafter Shapo, Representational Theory].
90 See Shapo, Representational Theory, supra note 89, at 1370.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See id. at 1370-71.
94 See Traynor, supra note 26, at 370.
95 See Shapo, Representational Theory, supra note 89, at 370-71.
96 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some ThOllghts on Risk Distrilmtion and the Law oj Torts, 70 YALE
88

89

LJ. 499 (1961).
97 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hawson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case Jor
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683 (1993).
98 See St.Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 316 N.E.2d 51, 70-71 (Ill. App. 1974).

1997]

STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY

241

benefits of his or her bargain and his or her bargaining autonomy.99
Therefore, all manufacturer product representations, including labels
and advertisements, should be considered in determining the safety
expectations to which the consumer is entitled. lOO
Consumers also have a generalized understanding that governmental regulations mandate consumer safety.lOl The media and governmental entities, as well as manufacturers, may disseminate information
about such governmental regulations,102 as well as voluntarily adopted
industry standards. lo3 Clearly, the manufacturer's affirmative obligation
to provide consumers "with product information which warns of dangers or instructs about safe use depends on the general availability of
this information.104 If such information is already known to the reasonable consumer, there is no reason for the manufacturer to provide it.
However, if the information is not known, or if the defect which creates
harm is latent or hidden, the manufacturer should warn consumers. 105
Consumers are entitled to such information because they reasonably
expect manufacturers will discover fores~eable product risks and will
warn consumers about them.106
The issue of presumed knowledge creates troublesome issues for this
consumer-oriented analysis. Even if product risks are neither known
nor discoverable, given the state of the art (scientific and technological
knowledge) at the time of sale, allocation of responsibility for resulting
accidents can still be assigned from a COnsumer expectation view-

See Shapo, Representational Theory, supra note 89, at 1109.
looId.

99

101 The general public sees examples of governmental regulation in everyday life. For example,
prescription drugs and medical devices are extensively regulated by the FDA, pursuant to the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, originally enacted in 1932. See 21 U.s.C. §§ 301-395
(1994). Some drug warnings must be provided directly to consumers. See, e.g., Patient Package
Inserts for Oral Contraceptives, 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (1995) (requiring package inserts for oral
contraceptives) .
102 See, e.g., The National Highway Traffic & Safety Administration Authorization Act of 1991,
49 U.S.C. §§ 30117-30121 (1994); see also The Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C . § 1191 (1994);
The Federal Hazardous Substance Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1272 (1994); The Poison Prevention
Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1472 (1994); The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 20542055 (1994).
103 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 127 (1991).
104 See, e.g., Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the 'Right to Know'Jrom the 'Need
to Know' about Consumer Hazards, 11 YALE].. ON REG . 293 (1994).
105 See Shapo, Representational Theory, supra note 89, at 1153-55.
106 See James A. Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L.
REv. 919, 939-49 (1981).
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point. I07 Unlike the previously discussed situations in which the manufacturer affirmatively makes representations of product safety, the
manufacturer now remains silent. IOS Arguably, such silence cannot create false expectations of product safety, unless it is assumed that consumers believe, and are entitled to believe, the false concept that all
product risks are discoverable prior to marketing. 109
Nevertheless, the manufacturer still profits at the expense of the
injured consumer from a product containing unknowable or undiscoverable product defects. 110 As a result, it may be inherently equitable
to force the manufacturer to pay even for such undiscoverable product
risks. II1 Since the manufacturer profits from the product, he or she
should pay the entire cost of producing that product, including accident costs. ll2 Moreover, the consumer cannot discover these unknowable or undiscoverable risks either.1l3
On the other hand, consumer expectations may be quite different.
Consumers know that the world contains many unknown or undiscoverable dangers and that those who seek the benefits of innovative
products may encounter such risks. 114 For example, the media informs
consumers on an almost daily basis of newly discovered side effects of
over-the-counter and prescription drugs. Consumers generally want
the benefits of scientific and technological advancements, and realize
that unknowable risks might be encountered. 115 Therefore, the consumer harmed by an unknowable product design defect may not be
entitled to an expectation of safety.116

107

See generally Wertheimer, supra note 68.

108 SeeJames

A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The
Empty Shell ofFailure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 273-78 (1990).
109 See id.; see also Owen, Rethinking the Policies, supra note 29, at 703-07.
110 See Beshada v.Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (NJ. 1982) (imposing manufucturer liabilio/ for failure to warn of unknowable risks of asbestosis advances strict liabilily).
Beshada was the subject of considerable criticism. See, e.g., Symposium, The Passage of Time: The
Implications for Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733, 751 (1983). The New Jersey Supreme
Court refused to apply Beshada to prescription drugs in Feldman v. Lederie Lab., 479 A.2d 374,
388 (NJ. 1984).
111 See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547; see also Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment K and for Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 891 (1983) ("Both the justification of
justifiable expectations on the part of product victims and the achievement of modest advances
in safeo/ justifY the application of strict liabilio/ to harm from unknmvable generic hazards.").
112 See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 547.
113 See id. at 548.
114 See Birnbaum, supra note 14, at 604.
115 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal. 1988) (finding prescription drugs
"unavoidably unsafe" under comment K to § 402A).
116Professor David G. Owen forcefully argues that permitting recovery for unknowable and
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At the same time, manufacturing defects or flaws disappoint the very
consumer expectations which consumers are entitled to expect (in
large measure because the manufacturer expressly created those expectations), and which products liability law must therefore protect. ll7
Understandably, when the consumer purchases a product, he or she
pays for its qualities, including safety, common to each product unit
made according to the same design. us In other words, the consumer
is entitled to expect his or her product to be as safe as other units of
that same product. u9 If the consumer receives a product with a dangerous manufacturing flaw, his or her reasonable expectations are
thwarted. At a minimum, consumers are entitled to expect that a
product does not contain atypical flaws, and that it minimally meets
the manufacturer's own specifications and requirements. 120
This focus on consumer expectations in manufacturing defect cases
is equitable given the manufacturer's control of product safety.l2l The
manufacturer establishes the level of quality control, designs the product, and generally possesses greater safety information. 122 On the other
hand, the consumer bears responsibility for actual product use. 123 For
example, if the consumer chooses to use a product which is obviously
dangerous124 or if he or she uses the product in a highly unusual and
undiscoverable product defects is immoral, violating the basic purpose of the tort system. See
Owen, The Fault Pit, supra note 59, at 714-20.
Jl7 See Singleton v. International Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (product is
defective if it fails to conform to manufacturer's specifications and promises).
118 See generally Owen, Defectiveness Restated, supra note 8, at 751 (noting that section 2(a) of
the Products Liability Restatement retains the consumer expectations test}.
119 See, e.g., Ducko v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 639 A.2d 1204, 1205-06 (Pa. Super. 1994) (malfunction theory as complementary test for deviation from the norm).
120Commentators and courts agree that the manufacturing defect case presents the clearest
and strongest case for applying both strict liability in tort and the consumer expectations test. See
Fischer, supra note 1, at 348. Manufacturing defects exist when a product fails to meet the
manufacturer's own specifications and quality control standards. See id. at 343. Two examples of
manufacturing defects are flaws in the raw materials or component parts of a product, or an error
in the assembly of component parts. Shortcomings in quality control might create such defects.
The archetypical cases are the exploding soda bottle and the contaminated food or drink.
The appropriateness of the consumer expectations test for manufacturing defects is almost
universally acknowledged. See id. at 348. Reasonable consumer expectations clearly are defeated
by a product which fails to meet the manufacturer's own standards. See id.
121 SeeJenkins v. General Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1971) (car manufacturer's
negligent failure properly to tighten and inspect bolt in left rear suspension).
122 See, e.g, Greenman v. YUba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
123 Jd. at 901 ("Implicit in the machine's presence on the market ... was a representation that
it would safely do the jobs for which it was built. ... To establish the manufacturer's liability it was
sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was
intended to be used . .. .n) (emphasis added).
124 See Pressley v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 738 F.2d 1222, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 1984) (under Georgia
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unintended manner, he or she has no legitimate expectation of
safety.l25 As a result, the consumer, rather than a potential product
defect, has caused the harm. 126
Fundamentally, the manufacturing defect affects a small percentage
of litigated cases. 127 As a result, the manufacturer can treat the manufacturing defect as an unfortunate aberration or departure-the product line, as a whole, remains free from condemnation as being defective. 128 By contrast, design defects condemn the entire product line. 129
Defectively designed products are constructed and manufactured according to the manufacturer's intended specifications; nevertheless,
the product contains an inherent danger. 13o The defectively designed
product fails to perform intended functions safely, creates dangerous
contraindications or side effects,131 or fails to minimize foreseeable
injury in the event of accident.
Unfortunately, classifying product defects as manufacturing, design
or marketing defects (defective warnings and instructions) often
proves a futile and ineffective analytical exercise. Some American cases
and the European Directive treat warning defects as a type of design
defect. 132 Warning defects, like design defects, exist in the entire product line, while manufacturing or production flaws are atypical. 133 Moreover, design and warning flaws may overlap. For example, a paydozer
law, there is no liability for failing to equip riding lawn mowers with a deadman switch since
danger of being hit by the moving blade in fall from the mower is obvious}. CJ. Micallefv. MichIe
Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y 1976).
125 See Estrada v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 734 F.2d 1218, 1220 (7th Cir. 1984) (under Indiana law
where factory worker's hand was injured while brushing ink on rollers, the court stated, ".•• go
to the zoo and put your hand through the bars of the lion's cage, and the lion bites your hand
off, ... you do not have an action against the zoo").
126 See, e.g., Bartkewich v. Billinger, 247 A.2d 603, 605-06 (Pa. 1968).
127 See, e.g., Ducko v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 639 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Pa. 1994) (circumst.mtial
evidence permitted to prove manufacturing defect in automobile).
128The main manufucturing defect tests, "deviation from the norm" and the "malfunction
theory" indicate that the defective product is an unfortunate exception to the rest of the product
line.
129Because the design defect affects each unit of production, "questions related to 'design
defects' and the determination of when a product is defective, because of the nature ofits design,
appear to be the most agitated and controversial issues before the courts in the field of products
liability." Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984).
130 See generally Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 2.
131 See Prentis, 365 N.W.2d at 182.
132By this, I mean that, in defective warning cases, courts apply negligence concepts in strict
liability failure to warn cases. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (NJ. 1984)
(prescription drugs). The European Directive accomplishes the same result by employing its
development defense language. See 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, art. 6(1} (c), 6(2}.
133 See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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which lacks rear-view mirrors and back-up warning signals could be
considered defectively designed, or the redesign could be viewed as
providing adequate warnings. 134
Design and production defects also may overlap or coincide. For
example, a worker is injured when he or she slips on hydraulic fuel
which has leaked into the operator's compartment of a roof-bolter
machine. An expert concludes that such leaks are ''virtually inevitable,"
but that the injury risk could be eliminated either by installing a floor
grating or by putting the hydraulic valve outside the operator's compartment. 135 In this situation, oil leakage could be viewed as a random or atypical manufacturing defect. On the other hand, if such
leakage is a "virtual inevitability," a design defect involving the entire
product line exists. 136 Deciding the design defect on a negligence-based
risk/utility analysis and the manufacturing defect on the consumer
expectation standard becomes unworkable and doctrinally indefensible. Applying the consumer expectations test protects the reasonable
product safety expectations to which such workers are entitled. 137
Consumer expectancy analysis can be useful in many warning situations as well. An analogy to medical informed consent is illustrative.
The consumer and the patient both know what warnings are necessary
for informed safety decision-making, whether in the medical context
or in the products liability situation. Medical malpractice law can teach
significant lessons. In the context of informed consent, the law focuses
on what the patient needs to be told in order to reach the informed
consent decision. 138 In the products arena, the consumer often knows
what information he or she needs in order to use the product safely.139
The availability of expert testimony may be important in these situations. l4O In the case of prescription drugs, warnings are made directly
to physicians as learned intermediaries. l41 Courts have recognized that
134 See Pike

v. Frank G. Hough Co., 467 P.2d 229, 234 (Cal. 1970).
Ingersoll-Rand Mining & Mach. Co., 960 F.2d 653, 654 (7th Cir. 1992).
136 See id. at 655-56.
137 See, e.g, Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982) (injured worker can
rely on consumer expectations in a defective design case; if there are none, risk-benefit analysis
should be employed).
138 See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession:
The "Accepted Practice" Fonnula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213 (1975).
139 See Hardie, supra note 53.
140 See Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1459 (lOth Cir. 1987) (expert permitted to
testity that product was unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectation of the average user).
141 See, e.g., Reyesv. Wyeth Lab., 498F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
Hill v. Squibb & Sons, E.R, 592 P.2d 1383 (Mont. 1979).
135 See Faucett v.
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expert testimony may be required to explain issues "with respect to
which laymen can have no knowledge at all. "142
Some scholars argue that the consumer expectations test is only an
effective approach for manufacturing or production defects. I43 Clearly,
the average consumer can understand that a foreign object in food or
an exploding soda bottle does not meet ordinary safety expectations.
On the other hand, many scholars argue that the consumer expectations test may not be useful in warning cases. I44 However, this argument
may take too limited a view of consumer capabilities.
Basically, the consumer expectations test asks whether the product's
safety conforms to what a reasonable consumer expects. I45 If the product does not so conform, it is defective. I46 Scholars recognize a number
of problems with this test. 147 They argue that consumer expectations
may be too high, too low or even non-existent because the consumer
is particularly cynical, knowledgeable, or risk-averse. I48 These criticisms
may focus too much on idiosyncratic or subjective consumer knowledge, rather than on what the reasonable consumer understands and
expects. Obvious dangers present the archetypical situation. For example, because a punch press without a safety device presents an obvious
danger to the consumer, it might be considered non-defective. Nevertheless, a consumer may be entitled to expect a product to be safe even
if, as currently designed, it contains an obvious flaw. I49
Similarly, the argument that the consumer can have no expectation
of product safety with respect to obvious danger is misplaced. A consumer can expect product safety even when exposed to obvious danger. I50 By analogy, obvious workplace dangers which are known to the
employee are nonetheless actionable under federal and state labor
laws. I51 If a product meets government safety standards, this could

142Hill,

592 P.2d at 1388 (quoting Callahan v. Burton, 487 P.2d 515, 518 (Mont. 1971».
& Twerski, A Proposed Revision, supra note 3, at 1532-34.

143 See Henderson
144 See

145 See,

id.
e.g., Vinces v. Esther Williams-All Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794 (Wis.

1975).
146 See Fischer,

supra note 1, at 348.
e.g., Mary J. Davis, Design Deject Liability: In Search of a Standard of Liability, 39 WAYNE
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provide evidence of safety expectations to which the consumer is entitled. I52
At the other extreme, scholars argue that consumers cannot have
expectations about products involving complicated design issues. I53
Requiring expert testimony can overcome these problems even in
complicated design situations. Juries often benefit from expert testimony in modern civil and criminal litigation. Expert testimony should
be used as readily in products liability cases as in manufacturing defect
cases. I54
Some scholars argue that the consumer-oriented test requires some
risk/utility balancing because courts must still determine whether such
expectations are reasonable. I55 Nevertheless, the essence of the consumer expectations test is whether the product would be merchantable
if the market knew of the danger. Significant policy considerations
support retention of the consumer-oriented test. If risk/utility analysis
is viewed as essentially identical to the theory of unreasonableness of
risk in negligence law, strict liability is thwarted. To the extent that this
is true, strict liability "failure to warn" cases also become indistinguishable from negligence cases.
A major controversy in American products liability centers on misuse, especially the question of whether misuse should be an affirmative
defense or part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. I56 A cogent application of the consumer expectations test requires that it be an affirmative defense. Misuse consists of two components: plaintiff conduct and
manufacturer foreseeability of such conduct. I57 In negligence actions,
the plaintiff bears burdens of production and persuasion regarding
defendant conduct, while the defendant carries these burdens for
plaintiff conduct. I5s Strict products liability actions should be less burdensome for the plaintiff than traditional negligence. Requiring the
plaintiff to establish the absence of misuse is burdensome, inconsistent

152 See, e.g., Miller v. Lee Apparel Co., 881 P.2d 576, 587 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (product
complying with federal flammability standards).
153 See Davis, Design Defect Liability, supra note 147, at 1236-37.
154 See, e.g., Nadine E. Roddy, Expert Testimony on the Adequacy of a Product's Warning: Recent
Cases, 12 PROD. LIAB. TRENDS 109 (Oct. 1987).
155 See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 139-42.
156 See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 352-56 (Md. 1985) (treating misuse
as part of plaintiffs case).
157 See Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of
Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REv. 403, 420-21 (1978).
153 See id. at 426.

248

BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW

[Vol. XX, No.2

and counterproductive. Therefore, plaintiff misuse should be an affirmative defense.
The main argument against this position is that intended use, the
opposite of misuse, is part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. 159 As a
result, the plaintiff must establish that the product is defective when
used in the intended and/or foreseeable manner. I60 From this perspective, misuse becomes an issue of proximate cause. Since proximate
cause is part of the plaintiffs burden of proof, by logical extension,
misuse becomes part of the plaintiffs burden as well. I61
A similar result is reached by decisions which focus on misuse in the
context of causation in fact.162 In this analysis, misuse becomes a superseding cause of injury. This concept is exemplified by the case of
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc. 163 The plaintiff wore a flammable nightgown inside out with two side pockets flapping and protruding. Mter
placing a kettle on the burner of her stove, plaintiff turned on the
burner. She reached above the stove to get a coffee filter from the
cupboard, causing one of the protruding pockets to contact the
burner, igniting her gown. The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that intended use constituted part of the plaintiffs prima facie
case. l64

III.

THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE AND LITIGATION REALITIES

The European Directive seeks to promote integration of Member
State markets by providing a uniform standard of product liability
safety: strict liability. 165 Although the European Directive mandates that
strict liability form the basis for producer (manufacturer) liability, it is
unlikely that this will result in the development of products liability law
similar to the American experience. Most ED Member States are civil
law countries, without a strong tradition of case law creating substantial
legal change. 166 Even in common law jurisdictions such as Ireland and
159 See Ellsworth,

495 A.2d at 355.

160Id.
161Id. at 355-56.
162See, e.g., McCormick v. Custom Pools, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. App. 1985) (Ua
warning would not have deterred McCormick from diving since a warning would have merely
informed him of risks of which he was already aware.").
163 Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 348.
164 See id. at 356.
165 1985 European Directive, supra note 7, pmhl.
166 See Patrick Thieffrey et aI., Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation Practice and
Impact on U.S. Manufacturers ofDirective 85/374,25 TORT & INS. LJ. 65, 66-67 (1989).
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England, legislation holds the primary position over case law. 167 Moreover, European litigants face disincentives to litigation, including the
cost of retaining counsel in light of the prohibition of contingent
fees. l68 Most significantly, juries will not decide product liability disputes. 169 AB a result, the development of strict product liability will have
a uniquely European perspective. European adoption of strict liability
for defective products need not result in an American-style litigation
explosion.1 70
CONCLUSION

The abandonment of the consumer expectations test may be shortsighted and imprudent. Although it has become commonplace to
criticize the consumer expectations test, these critiques apparently
ignore the fact that a central and paramount purpose of products
liability law is the protection of legitimate consumer safety expectations. Encouraging product development and innovation merits attention. However, such innovation neither compels nor should compel a
move to a manufacturer-oriented negligence standard which defeats
legitimate, bargained-for consumer expectations. These legitimate
products liability goals are promoted by the European Directive.
167 See

id. at 90-91.
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